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ABSTRACT
FUNCTIONAL OPPONENCY IN WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY PREDICTS
COGNITIVE FLEXIBILITY IN PROBLEM SOLVING
Charles A. Van Stockum, Jr.
July 25, 2019
Cognitive flexibility is a hallmark of individuals with higher working memory capacity
(WMC). Yet, research demonstrates that higher WMC individuals are sometimes more
likely to adopt rigid problem-solving approaches. The present research examines a novel
account for these contradictory findings—that different WMC mechanisms interact in
ways that both support and constrain cognitive flexibility. Across three studies,
participants completed the water jug task—a problem-solving task requiring them to first
establish and then break mental set using a complex strategy. Participants then completed
measures targeting three WMC mechanisms: attention control, primary memory, and
secondary memory. Study 1 demonstrated that primary memory and secondary memory
predict breaking mental set in opposite directions. Study 2 replicated these findings while
also demonstrating that attention control moderates these effects. Study 3 replicated these
results using a less restrictive sampling procedure (i.e., participants were provided the
complex strategy). The present research supports the proposed theory of functional
opponency in WMC.
Keywords: working memory; cognitive flexibility; attention; problem solving; mental set
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Working memory capacity (WMC) helps keep cognitive processes (memory and
attention) organized around task-relevant information (Adam & Vogel, 2016; Awh &
Vogel, 2008; Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001). Individual differences in WMC
thereby predict many and varied cognitive abilities (Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Gruszka
& Nęcka, 2017; Hambrick & Meinz, 2011; Hicks, Harrison, & Engle, 2015). For
example, individuals with higher WMC (high WMs) demonstrate greater fluid
intelligence (Gf)—the ability to solve novel reasoning problems (Kane, Hambrick, &
Conway, 2005; Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Süß, 2005). High WMs are also better
able to implement complex, cognitively-demanding strategies than lower WMC
individuals (low WMs; Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Fischer, & Holt, 2017; Gonthier
& Thomassin, 2015; Richmond, Redick, & Braver, 2015; Thomassin, Gonthier, Guerraz,
& Roulin, 2015). These abilities enable high WMs to better adapt to novel or changing
task demands (Bleckley, Durso, Crutchfield, Engle, & Khanna, 2003; Colflesh &
Conway, 2007; Gulbinaite, van Rijn, & Cohen, 2014; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014;
Shipstead & Broadway, 2013; Weldon, Mushlin, Kim, & Sohn, 2013; Wiley, Jarosz,
Cushen, & Colflesh, 2011)—a hallmark of cognitive flexibility (Collins & Koechlin,
2012; Ionescu, 2012).
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However, a superior capacity to restrict memory and attention to goal-relevant
information may also lead high WMs to overlook potentially useful information (e.g.,
Campbell, Hasher, & Thomas, 2010; Woehrle & Magliano, 2012; see Amer, Campbell,
& Hasher, 2016). For example, high WMs demonstrate greater bias for complex solutions
that have worked in the past, while overlooking new, simpler solutions to problems
(Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; DeCaro, Thomas, & Beilock, 2008; see also Fischer, & Holt,
2017; Ricks, Turley-Ames, & Wiley, 2007). This tendency can lead to cognitive
inflexibility, or mental set (Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2010; Schultz & Searleman,
2002). These and related findings challenge the assumption that “more” cognitive
abilities are always “better” (e.g., Beier & Oswald, 2012; Newell, 2015; cf. Bocanegra &
Hommel, 2014; Chrysikou, Weber, & Thompson-Schill, 2014; Hills & Hertwig, 2011),
the basis for a billion-dollar industry devoted to cognitive training and enhancement
(Hayes, Petrov, Sederberg, 2015; Matzen et al., 2016; Redick, Shipstead, Wiemers,
Melby-Lervåg, & Hulme, 2015; Rabipour & Raz, 2012; Simons et al., 2016).
Thus, research appears contradictory—indicating that high WMs are both more
cognitively flexible and inflexible than low WMs. How can we explain that WMC seems
to be both positively and negatively related to cognitive flexibility? The answer may
depend on how researchers have chosen to characterize WMC in the first place. That is, it
is customary to treat WMC as a unitary construct, and the preponderance of positive
associations in cognitive performance research (i.e., “positive manifold”) constitutes a
strong prior (Beier & Oswald, 2012; Chuderski & Jastrzębski, 2017). To overcome such a
prior, further evidence that WMC either positively or negatively predicts cognitive
flexibility may be less important than a theory for how asymmetrical findings such as
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these are even possible (see DeCaro, Van Stockum, & Wieth, 2016, 2017; DeCaro,
2018). A framework for treating WMC as a multifaceted construct may accommodate
such contradictions, allowing a more comprehensive account of the relationship between
WMC and cognitive flexibility to be articulated.
Mechanisms of Working Memory Capacity
Traditionally, WMC is treated as a unified construct reducible to individual
differences in a single, critical component (e.g., temporary memory storage capacity,
attention control; Cowan et al., 2005; Engle, 2002; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Kane,
Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001), or as the overall effectiveness (e.g., processing
efficiency) of a hierarchically organized system (e.g., Conway & Engle, 1996; Harrison,
Shipstead, & Engle, 2015; McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010;
Wilhelm, Hildebrandt, & Oberauer, 2013).
Recent studies, however, have demonstrated that multiple sources of variance are
needed to account for individual differences in WMC (Shipstead, Lindsey, Marshall, &
Engle, 2014; Unsworth, Fukuda, Awh, & Vogel, 2014; see Unsworth, 2016a, for a
review). These studies support a multifaceted view of WMC that emphasizes the distinct
contributions of three related mechanisms. Attention control (AC) is the ability to
constrain focal attention to relevant information and restrain inappropriate reflexive
thoughts and responses (Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999; Kane & Engle, 2003; McVay &
Kane, 2012). Primary memory (PM) is the ability to maintain and manipulate limited
amounts of information in a temporary state, in and around the focus of attention (Cowan,
2001; Oberauer, 2002; Unsworth & Engle, 2006). Secondary memory (SM) is the ability
to access or recover information via strategic search and retrieval processes (Unsworth &
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Engle, 2007a; Unsworth, 2016b; Unsworth & Spillers, 2010). These mechanisms have
been found to vary both between and within individuals, and jointly account for the
relationship between WMC and Gf (Shipstead et al., 2014; Unsworth et al., 2014).
The multifaceted view thus seeks to parse the predictive power of the WMC
construct by delimiting the relative contributions of component processes. According to
this view, tasks that rely on WMC demand each of these mechanisms (AC, PM, and SM)
to a greater or lesser extent (Unsworth et al., 2014). Importantly, tasks commonly used to
assess individual differences in WMC place greater demands on some of these
mechanisms over others. For example, Shipstead and colleagues (2014) demonstrated
that running span tasks (e.g., running letter span: remember the last n letters from lists
that are n + m letters long; Broadway & Engle, 2010) reflect PM more strongly than
complex span tasks. Complex span tasks (e.g., operation span: remember a series of
letters while alternately verifying solutions to simple math equations; Redick et al., 2012)
are more closely associated with AC and SM (see also Healey & Miyake, 2009;
Unsworth & Engle, 2007b; Unsworth & Spillers, 2010). Furthermore, running span
measures of WMC include a component of PM that is not reflected in complex span
measures.
Shipstead and colleagues proposed that this PM component reflects the ability to
disengage no-longer-relevant information from the focus of attention. Disengagement is
thought to contribute to PM capacity—and by extension cognitive flexibility—by
facilitating the breaking of temporary bindings between attention and active mnemonic
representations, thereby allowing novel combinations of information to be generated
(Shipstead et al., 2014; see also Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007; Wiley et al.,
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2011). However, this PM mechanism of disengagement has not been tested as a predictor
of cognitive flexibility.
The multifaceted view of WMC provides new opportunities to revisit classic
effects and reexamine long-standing assumptions to generate novel hypotheses that better
capture the interplay of WMC mechanisms (e.g., Engle, 2018; Martin et al., 2017; Redick
et al., 2016; Sattizahn, Moser, & Beilock, 2016; Shipstead, Harrison, & Engle, 2016).
One method for developing a deeper understanding of the multifaceted nature of WMC is
by investigating interactions between AC, PM, and SM in the prediction of various
outcomes. Of note, classic and contemporary definitions of WMC cite the importance of
both memory and attention (Badre, 2011; Engle & Kane, 2004; Hutchinson & TurkBrowne, 2012; Mackie, Van Dam, & Fan, 2013; Richter & Yeung, 2012; Shipstead et al.,
2016; Summerfield, Lepsien, Gitelman, Mesulam, & Nobre, 2006; Unsworth & Engle,
2007a). However, investigations of interactions between memory and attention are
virtually nonexistent in the WMC literature (but see Sattizahn et al., 2016). Perhaps most
importantly, a better understanding of how WMC mechanisms interact may clarify
seemingly contradictory findings within the literature (see Stroebe & Strack, 2014).
Cognitive Flexibility versus Cognitive Stability
The virtues of “being flexible” are extolled in colloquial discourse—and for good
reason: cognitive flexibility enables individuals to update their plans or expectations in
response to new information, explore alternative strategies for solving problems, and
generally adapt behaviors to changing environmental demands (Collins & Koechlin,
2012; Ionescu, 2012). Greater cognitive flexibility is associated with favorable outcomes
throughout the lifespan, including early math and reading skills (Yeniad, Malda,
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Mesman, van IJzendoorn, & Pieper, 2013), emotional resilience and psychological health
in adulthood (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004; Kashdan &
Rottenberg, 2010), and fitness and mobility in older adults (Berryman et al., 2013).
Equal and opposite to cognitive flexibility stands cognitive stability, the ability to
maintain goals and goal-relevant information in the face of distraction (Armbruster,
Ueltzhöffer, Basten, & Fiebach, 2012; Cools & D'Esposito, 2011). Cognitive stability
helps individuals resist non-adaptive changes (e.g., inappropriate reflexive responses,
goal neglect) and promotes consistency over time (Kiyonaga, Scimeca, Bliss, & Whitney,
2017). When an individual demonstrates excessive cognitive stability and resists adaptive
changes, cognitive rigidity can occur (e.g., Altamirano, Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010;
Joormann, Levens, & Gotlib, 2011). Cognitive rigidity (Schultz & Searleman, 2002) is
characteristic of several psychiatric and neurologic disorders, including Parkinson's
disease (Kehagia, Barker, & Robbins, 2014), autism spectrum disorder (Miller,
Ragozzino, Cook, Sweeney, & Mosconi, 2015), and anorexia nervosa (Lao-Kaim et al.,
2015). It is thus unsurprising that increasing cognitive flexibility is a goal of many
cognitive and behavioral training and enhancement regimens (Coubard, Duretz, Lefebvre,
Lapalus, & Ferrufino, 2011; Diamond, 2012; Masley, Roetzheim, & Gualtieri, 2009;
Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Ritter et al., 2012).
The notion that goal-directed behavior relies on a cognitive system that is
simultaneously both stable and flexible has been described as a control dilemma (Bilder,
2012; Blackwell & Munakata, 2014; Goschke, 2000; Hills & Hertwig, 2011), as there are
both adaptive and maladaptive aspects to each process. For instance, cognitive flexibility
helps facilitate adaptive changes (e.g., updating goals based on new information,
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switching between multiple goals), and thus combats cognitive rigidity, which can occur
in cases of excessive cognitive stability. In contrast, cognitive stability assists individuals
with remaining on-task and focused on goal-oriented behaviors, and thus combats
distraction, which can occur in cases of excessive cognitive flexibility (e.g., Dreisbach &
Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011). Because cognitive stability and flexibility
subserve functionally opposing goals, they sometimes conflict (Badre & Wagner, 2006;
Hazy, Frank, & O'Reilly, 2007; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; see Herd et al., 2014, for a
review). The relationship between cognitive stability and flexibility is thus characterized
as one of “functional opponency” (Goschke, 2000).
Functional opponency is based on the theory that adaptive biological and
cognitive abilities function “meaningfully” only within a system of constraints (Badre,
2011; Cohen, Aston-Jones, Gilzenrat, 2004; Hertwig & Todd, 2003). Opponent functions
within a system are antagonistic (i.e., more of one, less of the other), resulting in tradeoffs (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008). A system is adaptive to the extent that opponent
functions are appropriately balanced (e.g., maximally aligned to current demands on the
system of the environment), minimizing trade-offs and optimizing overall function
(Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Chrysikou et al., 2014; Hills & Hertwig, 2011).
Cognitive Flexibility and Working Memory Capacity
Cognitive control, a set of processes supporting adaptive goal pursuit (Fan, 2014),
is one such system thought to require a dynamic balance between cognitive stability and
flexibility (e.g., Chiew & Braver, 2017; Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Ionescu, 2017).
Individual differences in these abilities may contribute to an imbalance between stable
versus flexible cognition. WMC is an important predictor of cognitive control (e.g.,
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D'Esposito & Postle, 2015; Engle, 2010; Gulbinaite et al., 2014); thus, individual
differences in WMC mechanisms may reflect functional opponency. Indeed,
contradictory findings within the WMC and cognitive flexibility literature appears to
support the notion that functional opponency is at play.
Because cognitive stability and flexibility reflect a dynamic adaptive system, no
task can be considered a “process-pure” measure of either. In particular, it is difficult to
imagine a task that does not require some degree of goal maintenance (i.e., cognitive
stability; Shipstead et al., 2014; Engle, 2018). Thus, different measures of cognitive
flexibility may rely on cognitive stability to a greater or lesser extent (Chrysikou et al.,
2014). Indeed, the extent to which the flexible behavior being measured is made possible
by stable cognitions may help explain why some measures of cognitive flexibility tend to
correlate either positively or negatively with WMC.
Positive correlations are typically found between WMC and performance on tasks
that require alternating flexibly (i.e., quickly and appropriately) between sets of stimulusresponse rules (e.g., task switching, set shifting, multitasking; Draheim, Hicks, & Engle,
2016; Gulbinaite et al., 2014; Redick et al., 2016; Weldon et al., 2013). Commonly cited
as measures of cognitive flexibility, these tasks often require maintaining two or more
active sets of stimulus-response rules in WM, and thus place relatively high demands on
stability (Bunge & Zelazo, 2006; Dajani & Uddin, 2015; Kim, Johnson, Cilles, & Gold,
2011). Positive correlations with WMC are also found for tasks where flexibility is
contingent upon the ability to suppress distraction (e.g., Colflesh & Conway, 2007;
Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). In sum, cognitive flexibility tasks that tend to correlate
positively with WMC may actually rely on stability to a greater extent than flexibility.
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Tasks that tend to correlate negatively with WMC are those that require flexible
problem-solving (e.g., mental set and insight problem-solving tasks; Beilock & DeCaro,
2007; Van Stockum & DeCaro, 2014; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). In problem solving, being
flexible means being able to deviate from set procedures in order to find new and
efficient solutions to problems (Dick, 2014; Star & Seifert, 2005). Mental set is a
cognitive mechanism that biases attention to ensure a speedy response in familiar
contexts but can also lead to errors when the optimal solution conflicts with familiar
methods (Bilalić et al., 2010; Verguts & De Boeck, 2002). Mental set problem-solving
tasks thus require flexibility in “overcoming” a suboptimal approach that is strongly
activated by prior experience solving similar problems (i.e., “breaking” mental set). For
example, Beilock and DeCaro (2007) found that high WMs were more likely to persist in
using a complex problem-solving strategy despite the availability of simpler, more
efficient alternatives (see Fischer & Holt, 2017, for a similar finding). Insight problems
are problems that have a high probability of triggering a "faulty” initial problem
representation (i.e., a representation that has a low probability of activating the
knowledge needed to solve the problem; Ohlsson, 1992). Solving insight problems is
thought to require relaxing unnecessary constraints based on prior experience solving
similar problems, analogous to breaking mental set (DeCaro et al., 2016; Öllinger, Jones,
& Knoblich, 2008). Mental set and insight problem-solving tasks demonstrate how old
strategies may hinder new solutions (Collins & Koechlin, 2012; Knoblich, Ohlsson,
Haider, & Rhenius, 1999). Thus, cognitive flexibility tasks that tend to correlate
negatively with WMC may rely on flexibility to a greater extent than stability (Barbey,
Colom, & Grafman, 2013; Chrysikou et al., 2014).
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Thus, different tasks demand more or less flexible cognition: just as it is possible
to be “too stable” (i.e., rigid) it is likewise possible to be “too flexible” (e.g., distracted).
WMC may help balance these competing demands. However, individual differences in
specific WMC mechanisms may determine who is likely to strike the appropriate balance
or risk trade-offs in a given task.
Present Research
The principal goal of the present research was to test the novel hypothesis that
WMC simultaneously supports and constrains cognitive flexibility, using a single
outcome measure. To accomplish this goal, three studies were conducted. An overview of
general methodology and hypotheses common to each study is provided here. Methods
and hypotheses specific to each study are presented in their corresponding sections
(Chapters 2–4). Goals for each study are summarized at the end of this section.
Cognitive Flexibility
In each study, cognitive flexibility was measured using a classic “mental set”
problem-solving task—Luchins’s (1942) water jug task. This task requires individuals to
discover a complex, multistep strategy to solve a series of problems (see Figure 1). This
strategy may be used for all subsequent problems. However, halfway through the task,
simpler, single step strategies can also be correctly applied to solve the remaining
problems. Of interest is whether individuals flexibly switch to the simpler strategies when
they become available (i.e., “break” mental set).
The water jug problems and procedure were the same as used by Beilock and
DeCaro (2007). The first three problems (“set problems”) were intended to induce mental
set, and thus could only be solved using the complex strategy. Individuals were deemed
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to have “established” mental set if they correctly solved the set problems. The last three
problems (“critical problems”) were used to assess cognitive flexibility, as indexed by the
number of problems solved using the simpler strategies. Importantly, participants were
informed that multiple solutions might be possible and instructed to find the simplest
solution.

Figure 1. Example water jug set problem. Participants mentally derived a formula to
obtain a “goal” quantity of water by using three jugs (A, B, and C) of various
ungraduated capacities and a hypothetical unlimited water supply. All six experimental
problems were solvable by the formula B − A − 2C (i.e., Fill Jug B, then pour out enough
to fill Jug A once and Jug C twice, leaving the goal quantity in Jug B). The first three
(“set”) problems could only be solved using this formula, whereas the last three
(“critical”) problems were also solvable via a simpler formula (e.g., A − C).
Working Memory Capacity Mechanisms
In each study, the unique associations between three WMC mechanisms (AC,
PM, and SM) and performance on the water jug task were examined. The WMC tasks
were selected based on previous research demonstrating that these tasks place relatively
higher demands on one or more of these mechanisms. The antisaccade task requires
maintenance of a single goal (i.e., “look away from the flash”), and is thus considered a
relatively process-pure measure of AC (see Engle, 2018; Kane & Engle, 2003; Roberts,
Hager, & Heron, 1994).
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The running span task requires remembering the last n items from lists n + m
items long (Pollack, Johnson, & Knaff, 1959). Critically, participants do not know how
many items will be presented in a given trial (i.e., participants are told n, but not m). In
the version of the running span used in the present research, letters were presented at a
rate of two per second (Broadway & Engle, 2010; see also Shipstead et al., 2014). This
fast presentation of items in lists of unpredictable length is thought to impede proactive
recall strategies (e.g., rehearsal, grouping; Cowan et al., 2005; updating, Bunting, Cowan,
& Saults, 2006), yielding a more direct measure of the maximum amount of information
that can be maintained in the focus of attention or “absolute capacity” of PM (see
Shipstead et al., 2014, for a review).
The operation span task requires remembering a series of letters while verifying
solutions to simple math equations (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).
Critically, this secondary verification task is required following the presentation of each
to-be-remembered letter, distracting participants from the recall task (the measure of
interest). This procedure is thought to lead to the displacement from the focus of attention
of some to-be-remembered letters that must then be retrieved (Unsworth & Engle,
2007a). Thus, recall performance on the operation span is largely a product of
individuals’ ability to resist attentional capture via AC and search and retrieve relevant
information via SM (Shipstead et al., 2014; Unsworth & Spillers, 2010).
Shipstead and colleagues (2014) demonstrated that variance unique to running
span measures of WMC (i.e., not shared with complex span measures of WMC) reflects
PM, whereas operation span scores reflect both AC and SM (see also Healey & Miyake,
2009; Unsworth & Engle, 2007b). In line with Shipstead et al. (2014), residual variance
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unique to the running span task (i.e., PM) was interpreted as disengagement, described
above. If the operation span task reflects both AC and SM (e.g., Shipstead et al., 2014), it
follows that, after controlling for AC and PM, variance unique to operation span would
reflect SM. In each study, multiple linear regression was used to isolate effects of AC,
PM, and SM, as measured by the antisaccade task, the running span task, and the
operation span task, respectively.
General Analyses
For all studies, a manipulation check was first conducted by correlating the
number of set problems solved and the number of critical problems solved via the simple
strategies. This analysis determined whether success on the set problems was negatively
associated with flexibility on the critical problems, indicating mental set was obtained
overall. Then, regression analyses were conducted to test ancillary hypotheses regarding
the ability to establish mental set (as indexed by the number of set problems solved) and
its relations to WMC mechanisms (i.e., AC, PM, and SM).
For individuals who established mental set (i.e., solved all three set problems
correctly), the correlation between the number of critical problems solved via the simple
strategies and mean response times for critical problems correctly solved (regardless of
which strategy was used) was examined to determine whether the expected negative
association between simple strategy use and response times was obtained. Then,
regression analyses were conducted to test principal hypotheses regarding the
relationships between WMC mechanisms (AC, PM, and SM) and the ability to break
mental set (as indexed by the number of critical problems solved via the simple
strategies).
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Hypotheses
General hypotheses common to each study were made for both set problems and
critical problems.
Set problems. It was expected that AC would support the ability to form an initial
mental representation of the water jug problems (DeCaro, 2018; DeCaro et al., 2016;
Wiley et al., 2011), leading to greater accuracy on problems requiring the complex
strategy. Therefore, it was predicted that individuals higher in AC would be more likely
to establish mental set.
The set problems were not expected to place relatively higher demands on either
stability or flexibility. Thus, it was predicted that establishing mental set would not be
significantly related to either SM or PM. The relationship between establishing mental set
and SM is further examined in Study 3.
Critical problems. It was expected that PM would facilitate disengagement from
the complex strategy (Shipstead et al., 2014) and allow novel combinations of
information to be generated (Oberauer et al., 2007), resulting in more frequent use of the
simple strategies. Therefore, it was predicted that individuals higher in PM would be
more likely to break mental set.
It was expected that SM would facilitate retrieval of the complex strategy
(Harrison et al., 2015; Verguts & De Boeck, 2002) and bias suboptimal persistence in this
approach (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; DeCaro et al., 2008), resulting in less frequent use of
the simple strategies. Therefore, it was predicted that individuals higher in SM would be
less likely to break mental set.
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Because all tasks required some degree of goal maintenance, and AC is a critical
component of this process (Engle, 2018; Shipstead et al., 2014), positive relationships
with AC were generally expected. Therefore, it was predicted that individuals higher in
AC would be more likely to break mental set. The role of AC in the hypothesized model
is further examined in Studies 2 and 3.
In sum, although both are typically associated with high WMs, the ability to
retrieve previously used strategies versus disengage may determine who demonstrates
cognitive flexibility. Such findings would support a multifaceted view of WMC in which
component processes do not always act in concert.
Study Goals
Three studies were conducted in order to establish support for the hypothesized model,
replicate findings and validate measures, and further explore and test boundary
conditions. Study 1 examined whether different WMC mechanisms (AC, PM, and SM)
differentially predict breaking mental set on the water jug task. Study 2 replicated Study
1 with a larger sample, examined multiple measures of PM, and tested for moderation
between AC and each of the two memory-based WMC mechanisms (i.e., PM and SM).
Study 3 utilized a modified water jug task designed to increase the likelihood that
participants established mental set, in order to test the hypothesized effects with a more
general sample.
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CHAPTER II
STUDY 1
Study 1 provided an initial test of these hypotheses. The WMC mechanisms
described above (AC, PM, and SM) were used to predict performance on both set
problems and critical problems on the water jug task. It was predicted that the WMC
mechanisms would predict performance on the water jug task in different directions.
Method
Participants
Eighty-one undergraduate students (46 females, 35 males; Mage = 20 years, SD =
2.8) participated for psychology course credit. Four additional participants were removed
for (a) committing more than 20 errors on the math portion of the operation span (n = 1;
Conway et al., 2005), (b) prior exposure to water jug problems (i.e., reported having seen
the problems before and having remembered the answer, and correctly answered at least
one critical problem using the simpler strategy; n = 1), or (c) identification as a univariate
outlier (i.e., scores greater than 3 SDs from scale means; n = 2). Exclusion criteria and
sample size were based on Beilock and DeCaro (2007, Experiment 2). Thirty-nine of the
total 81 participants (48%) solved all three set problems and were thereby deemed to
have established mental set.
Procedure
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Participants were tested individually in a single session with breaks. After
providing informed consent, participants completed the tasks on a computer in the
following order: operation span, antisaccade, running span, water jug. Afterwards,
participants completed a questionnaire assessing prior experience with water jug
problems and demographics and were debriefed.
Working Memory Capacity Tasks
Antisaccade task (Hallett, 1978). Each trial began with a central fixation cross
(1000 or 2000 ms), followed by an asterisk that appeared for 300 ms on either side of the
screen. Upon seeing the asterisk, participants were instructed to immediately divert their
gaze to the opposite side where one of two letters (O or Q) appeared for 100 ms
(backwards masked) (see Figure 2). Participants had 5000 ms to respond by pressing the
key corresponding to the letter presented. Participants completed 32 practice trials,
followed by 48 critical trials on which accuracy (proportion correct) served as the
dependent measure (Shipstead et al., 2014).

Figure 2. Example of the antisaccade task. The antisaccade requires resisting attentional
capture in the face of distraction (i.e., “look away from the flash”).
Running span task (Broadway & Engle, 2010). Participants saw a series of
unrelated letters and were asked to remember the last 3–7. Trials ranged from 3–9 letters
in length, presented in blocks of three according to the number of to-be-remembered
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letters (5 blocks total, in random order). Each block included one “whole recall” trial, in
which the number of to-be-remembered letters was equal to the number of letters
presented, and two “partial recall” trials, in which the number of letters presented
exceeded the number of to-be-remembered letters by one or two (see Figure 3). The order
of trials within each block was random. The number of to-be-remembered letters was
displayed at the beginning of each block. Critically, participants did not know how many
letters would be presented in a given trial. Each letter was presented for 300 ms, with an
inter-stimulus interval of 200 ms. The dependent measure was the total number of to-beremembered letters correctly recalled in the correct serial position (regardless of whether
the entire sequence of letters was correct) across all trials, out of 75 possible (Shipstead et
al., 2014).
Select the letters in the order
presented.

Remember the last
three letters.

H

R

F
K
P
S

Y

H
L
Q
T

J
N
R
Y

HRY

Remember the last
three letters.

K

Select the letters in the order
presented.

N

J

S

F
K
P
S

H
L
Q
T

J
N
R
Y

NJS

Figure 3. Example of the running span task: whole recall trial (top) and partial recall trial
(bottom). The running span requires remembering the last 3–7 letters from series of 3–9
letters.
Operation span task (Unsworth, et al., 2005). Participant saw an arithmetic
problem (e.g., (1 * 2) + 1 = ?) and were instructed to mentally derive the answer and then
click the mouse. Participants were then shown a number (e.g., 3) and required to indicate
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whether this was the correct answer by clicking either “True” or “False”. Finally,
participants were shown a letter to remember, drawn randomly from a set of unrelated
letters (see Figure 4). Following a sequence of problem-letter strings ranging from 3-7 in
length, participants were asked to recall the letters in the order presented. Participants
completed 3 sequences of each string length in random order. The dependent measure
was the sum of all letters recalled in the correct serial position (regardless of whether the
entire sequence of letters was correct) across all trials, out of 75 possible (Shipstead et al.,
2014).
Select the letters in the order
presented.

3

K

(1 * 2) + 1 = ?
True

False

F
K
P
S

H
L
Q
T

J
N
R
Y

K******

Figure 4. Example of the operation span task. The operation span requires remembering
series of 3-7 letters while alternately verifying solutions to simple math equations.
Problem-Solving Task
Water jug task (Luchins, 1942). To assess cognitive flexibility, participants
performed the water jug task, a classic “mental set” problem-solving task. Problems and
procedure were the same as used by Beilock and DeCaro (2007). Problems were
presented on a computer, and participants were asked to solve the problems mentally and
then type their solutions (no paper was provided). Each experimental problem depicted
three jugs (A, B, and C) of various ungraduated capacities, and a fourth to be “filled” to a
specified goal quantity (see Figure 1). Participants were instructed to mentally derive a
mathematical formula resulting in the goal quantity using the three jugs provided and a
hypothetical unlimited water supply. Participants were informed that all three jugs need
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not be used to solve the problems, and that multiple solutions might be possible.
Importantly, participants were also instructed to use the simplest method possible. All six
experimental problems (see Table 1) were solvable via the same computationally
demanding strategy (i.e., B − A − 2C). The first three problems (“set problems”) were
only solvable using this complex strategy; the last three problems (“critical problems”)
were also solvable via a simpler strategy (i.e., A + C or A − C). Prior to the experimental
problems, participants saw one example problem (Jug A = 29, Jug B = 11, and Goal = 7)
and answer (A − 2C or 29 − 11 − 11) and had an opportunity to ask questions. This
example problem used only two jugs to limit similarity with the experimental problems.
In line with previous studies (e.g., Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Gasper, 2003), individuals
were deemed to have established mental set if they correctly solved all three set
problems. The primary dependent measure was the number of critical problems correctly
solved using the simple strategies, with higher scores denoting greater cognitive
flexibility.
Table 1
Water Jug problems.
Jug
Problem

A

B

C

Goal

1
2
3
4
5
6

23
11
20
23
15
14

96
48
59
49
39
36

3
6
4
3
3
8

67
25
31
20
18
6
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Results and Discussion
Variables and Analyses
Individual differences in AC, PM, and SM were operationally defined as variance
unique to the antisaccade, running span, and operation span (respectively), when all three
were entered simultaneously into a multiple regression model (cf. Shipstead et al., 2014).
Two dependent measures from the water jug task were examined: (a) the ability to
establish mental set (i.e., learn the complex strategy), operationalized by the number of
set problems solved, and (b) the ability to break mental set once established,
operationalized as the number of critical problems solved using simple strategies.
All multiple linear regressions were inspected for normality using normal Q-Q
plots and histograms of studentized residuals. Homoscedasticity of error variance was
assessed using scatterplots of studentized residuals versus standardized predicted values.
Collinearity was examined using variance inflation factors (VIFs). For each regression in
Study 1, studentized residuals showed little deviation from normality. Likewise,
scatterplots did not reveal any clear patterns of data spread, indicating that
homoscedasticity was adequate. VIFs did not exceed 1.4 for any of the predictors in
either model (any value below 10 was deemed acceptable), indicating that
multicollinearity was not an issue.
Set Problems
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among key variables for all participants
are presented in Table 2. The number of set problems solved was significantly positively
associated with antisaccade, but not significantly associated with running span or
operation span. Additionally, a negative but not significant association was found
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between the number of set problems solved and the number of critical problems solved
using simple strategies (M = 1.47, SD = 1.32, r(79) = −.22, p = .050). This finding
suggests that individuals who were more likely to establish mental set in the first half of
the task were less likely to break mental set in the second half of the task, consistent with
previous studies in which mental set resulted from prior experience or domain-specific
knowledge (e.g., Bilalić et al., 2010; Crooks & McNeil, 2009; Ellis & Reingold, 2014;
Wiley, 1998).
Table 2
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among key variables for all
participants in Study 1.
Correlations (r)
Measure

Mean

SD

1

2

3

1. Antisaccade

00.82

00.09

—

2. Running span

25.90

10.02

.16

—

3. Operation span

59.78

08.98

.33**

.43**

—

4. Set problems

01.89

01.24

.27*

.08

.15

4

—

N = 81. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Next, it was examined whether individual differences in WMC mechanisms (i.e.,
AC, PM, and SM) predicted who was most likely to establish mental set. The number of
set problems solved was regressed simultaneously on antisaccade, running span, and
operation span (see Table 3). There was a significant main effect of antisaccade (β = .25,
p = .036), but not running span (β = .01, p = .925) or operation span (β = .06, p = .630).
These results indicate that AC (i.e., variance unique to the antisaccade when controlling
for the other predictors in the model) was significantly positively associated with success
on the set problems and thus important for establishing mental set. This finding
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corresponds with work linking AC to the ability to mentally represent novel problems
and execute multistep operations (see DeCaro et al., 2016).
Table 3.
Simultaneous regression predicting the number of set problems solved for all
participants in Study 1.
β

t

Sig.

sr2

Antisaccade (AC)

.25

2.14

.036

.05

Running span (PM)

.01

0.09

.925

.00

Operation span (SM)

.06

0.48

.630

.00

Predictor

Note. AC = attention control; PM = primary memory; SM = secondary memory.
N = 81.
Critical Problems
Because mental set must be established before it can be broken, performance on
critical problems was examined only for those who solved the set problems (n = 39; see
Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Gasper, 2003). Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations
among key variables for individuals who established mental set (i.e., correctly solved all
three set problems) are presented in Table 4. The number of critical problems solved
using simple strategies was significantly negatively associated with operation span, but
not significantly associated with antisaccade or running span. Additionally, it was found
that errors on the critical problems were low (i.e., < 9% of all answers provided failed to
produce the goal quantity), indicating that when these individuals were not using the
simple strategies, they were using the complex strategy the majority of the time.
Consistent with previous studies, the simple (i.e., one-step) strategies were more efficient
than the complex (i.e., multistep) strategy: The more critical problems solved using the
simple strategies, the faster the mean response times for critical problems correctly
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solved (regardless of which strategy was used) (M = 22.17 sec, SD = 14.70 sec, r(30) =
−.49, p = .004)1.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among key variables for individuals
who established mental set in Study 1.
Correlations (r)
Measure

Mean

SD

1

2

3

1. Antisaccade

00.84

00.09

—

2. RunSpan whole recall

26.54

10.55

.12

—

3. Operation span

60.31

07.52

.21

.38*

—

4. Critical problems solved
using simple strategies

01.18

01.25

−.27

.14

−.37*

n = 39. *p < .05, **p < .01.
The principal research question for Study 1 was whether WMC mechanisms
differentially predict who is most likely to flexibly switch to simple strategies when they
become available (i.e., break mental set). To test this question, the number of critical
problems solved using simple strategies was regressed on antisaccade, running span, and
operation span, simultaneously, in order to estimate variance in strategy selection
uniquely predicted by each mechanism (i.e., AC, PM, and SM, respectively; see Table 5).
Antisaccade was not significantly associated with simple strategy use (β = –.22, p =
.153), possibly because the sample included only those individuals who correctly solved
the set problems and thereby also had higher AC.

1

To ensure that the RT measure was based on an equal number of observations for each

participant, 7 participants who committed a combined total of 10 errors on the critical
problems were excluded from this analysis (see Beilock & DeCaro, 2007).
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Operation span was significantly negatively associated with use of the simple
strategies (β = –.46, p = .007), indicating that individuals higher in SM were less likely to
break mental set. This finding suggests that greater ability to efficiently retrieve
previously used strategies via SM (Harrison et al., 2015) promotes persistent usage of
those strategies. This persistence can lead to cognitive rigidity in situations where cues
automatically elicit the wrong information (Verguts & De Boeck, 2002).
In contrast, running span was significantly positively associated with simple
strategy use (β = .34, p = .035), indicating that individuals higher in PM were more likely
to break mental set and thus demonstrate greater cognitive flexibility. This finding
provides novel evidence that greater ability to disengage PM from no-longer-relevant
information enables individuals to discover new, more efficient solutions.
Table 5.
Simultaneous regression predicting the number of critical problems solved using
simple strategies for individuals who established mental set in Study 1.
β

t

Sig.

sr2

−.22

−1.46

.153

.04

Running span (PM)

.34

2.19

.035

.10

Operation span (SM)

−.46

−2.87

.007

.17

Predictor
Antisaccade (AC)

Note. AC = attention control; PM = primary memory; SM = secondary memory.
n = 39.
Conclusions
By demonstrating that different WMC mechanisms (i.e., PM and SM) influence
the same cognitive flexibility outcome in opposite directions, Study 1 provides initial
support for the proposed theory of functional opponency in WMC. These results run
counter to the preponderance of evidence in individual differences research favoring
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positive associations between (and across) cognitive abilities (Beier & Oswald, 2012).
Indeed, these findings may even be considered “problematic, as they conflict with the
dominant view on the structure of cognitive abilities, which predicts a substantial
‘positive manifold’ among virtually all types of cognitive activity” (Chuderski &
Jastrzębski, 2017, p. 1994; cf. DeCaro et al., 2017). If the current findings reflect a real
phenomenon, they would have important ramifications for both theory and practice (see
Hills & Hertwig, 2011).
It is standard practice in publications of new effects, especially of effects that are
surprising, to publish one or two replications (Stroebe & Strack, 2014). Of note, Study 1
employed a novel variance-partitioning method for estimating individual differences in
WMC mechanisms. Although this method was based on a well-grounded theoretical
model with clear a priori hypotheses, additional comparisons are needed to rule out
alternative interpretations. Specifically, it is unclear whether the positive association
between PM and breaking mental set extends to other measures of PM or is specific to
the running span task (cf. Shipstead et al., 2014). Further specification of the source of
this effect will clarify interpretation and establish boundary conditions for directing
future studies. Thus, Study 2 tests additional markers of individual differences in PM for
purposes of comparison.
Finally, a key limitation of Study 1 was that the relationship between AC and
breaking mental set could not be fully examined. The ability to break mental set could
only be examined for individuals who first established mental set. Since AC was
positively associated with the number of set problems solved, it follows that a reduced
sample of individuals who solved all three set problems (i.e., established mental set)
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would be comprised of a greater proportion of those higher in AC. Thus, a larger more
representative sample was collected in Study 2, in order to more fully examine the
relationship between AC and breaking mental set.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY 2
Study 1 conceptually replicated Shipstead and colleagues’ (2014) findings and
extended them to make predictions about the specific WMC mechanisms underlying
mental set. Study 2 further examined these questions by replicating the methodology of
Study 1 with a larger sample and an additional measure of PM (immediate free recall).
The same pattern of results was expected for the set problems (i.e., positive
association with AC). Moreover, Study 2 tested the novel hypothesis that AC moderates
the opposing effects of PM and SM on breaking mental set. This hypothesis was
motivated by the finding in Study 1 that individuals higher in AC were more likely to
establish mental set. If breaking mental set is contingent upon the ability to establish it,
then higher AC may represent a boundary condition for observing these effects.
However, the sample size in Study 1 was insufficient to test this idea. Thus, a larger
sample was collected to ensure adequate representation of individual differences in AC,
PM, and SM and sufficient power for moderation analyses of the critical problems.
Moderation was also tested for the set problems, but no interactions were predicted
because these problems were not expected to place relatively higher demands on either
stability or flexibility.
It was hypothesized that individual differences in PM and SM would predict
breaking mental set in opposite directions, but only for individuals with higher AC,
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consistent with the pattern of results observed in Study 1. It was expected that PM would
facilitate disengagement from no-longer-relevant information (Shipstead et al., 2014) and
thus support breaking mental set. Specifically, disengagement may support breaking
mental set by allowing novel combinations of information to be generated (Oberauer et
al, 2007). Higher AC may improve the integrity of this process by mitigating attentional
capture at a time when PM is susceptible to intrusion from SM (Cosman & Vecera, 2013;
Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011; Kikumoto, Hubbard, & Mayr, 2016; Mayr, Kuhns, &
Hubbard, 2014; Richter & Yeung, 2012; Robison & Unsworth, 2017). Therefore, it was
hypothesized that PM would be positively related to breaking mental set, but only for
individuals with higher AC.
Additionally, it was expected that SM would facilitate retrieval of the complex
strategy (Harrison et al., 2015; Verguts & De Boeck, 2002) and thus bias suboptimal
persistence in this approach on the critical problems (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; DeCaro et
al., 2008). Specifically, SM may support the ability to retrieve information consistent
with prior knowledge or experience. Higher AC may enable the tendency of higher SM
individuals to do so by facilitating the identification of retrieval cues consistent with prior
knowledge or experience (Colzato, Steenbergen, & Hommel, 2018; Hills, Todd, &
Goldstone, 2010; Liesefeld, Hoffmann, & Wentura, 2015; Lilienthal, Rose, Tamez,
Myerson, & Hale, 2015; Schilling, Storm, & Anderson, 2014; Unsworth, Brewer, &
Spillers, 2013). Therefore, it was hypothesized that SM would be negatively related to
breaking mental set, but only for individuals with higher AC.
Although Shipstead and colleagues (2014) found that variance unique to running
span measures of WMC was strongly related to more commonly used measures of PM
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(e.g., immediate free recall, forward digit span), it is unclear whether the ability to
disengage from no-longer-relevant information is uniquely tapped by the running span.
Therefore, an additional goal of Study 2 was to validate the utility of the running span
task as a marker of PM in the hypothesized model. To accomplish this goal, running span
scores were split by trial type (i.e., whole recall versus partial recall) and treated as
separate markers of PM.
As illustrated in Figure 3, whole recall trials required remembering all letters
from lists that were 3–7 letters long, whereas partial recall trials required remembering
the last 3–7 letters from lists that were 4–9 letters long (a complete breakdown of the
running span task by trial parameters is shown in Table 6). Partial recall trials are thus
distinguished from whole recall trials by the presence of distractors, in the form of “tobe-forgotten” items (i.e., letters appearing at the beginning of the list that are not required
at recall). In contrast, whole recall trials are identical to trials on classic PM capacity
tasks, such as the forward digit span (Blankenship 1938), except the occurrence of whole
recall trials is unpredictable within each block of the running span (Morris & Jones,
1990; Mukunda & Hall, 1992; Palladino & Jarrold, 2008).
In the current study, running span performance was examined separately by trial
type in order to assess PM with and without the presence of distractors. Additionally, an
immediate free recall task was included for purposes of comparing the predictive utility
of the two running span trial type measures. Immediate free recall is a traditional measure
of PM that requires participants to recall a list of words in any order (Unsworth, Spillers,
and Brewer, 2010).
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Table 6
List length by target length (n), trial type (whole recall, partial recall), and distractors
(m) for all trials in the Running Span task.
Whole recall trials

Partial recall trials

n

m=0

m=1

m=2

3

3

4

5

4

4

5

6

5

5

6

7

6

6

7

8

7

7

8

9

Note: n = the number of targets (i.e., to-be-remembered letters) from end of list; m = the
number of distractors (i.e., letters preceding targets); list length = m + n. Trials were
presented in blocks of three (m = 0, m = 1, m = 2) according to n, in random order. The
order of trials within each block was random. n was displayed at the beginning of each
block.
The presence of distractors, in the form of a secondary processing component,
also distinguishes complex span tasks from traditional measures of PM (Shipstead et al.,
2014)—a distinction that has received exhaustive treatment in the literature (e.g., Bailey,
Dunlosky, & Kane, 2011; Colom, Rebollo, Abad, & Shih, 2006; Engle, Tuholski,
Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Healey & Miyake, 2009; Kane et al., 2004; Unsworth &
Engle, 2007b). Indeed, all span tasks are thought to involve some element of distraction,
and thus require SM, to the extent that memory items become displaced from PM and
must be retrieved at recall (Faraco et al., 2010; Lewandowsky, Geiger, Morrell, &
Oberauer, 2010; Unsworth & Engle, 2006; 2007a, b). Given that the presence of
distractors in span tasks is thought to increase reliance on SM, it was hypothesized that
running span partial recall scores would be less likely to evidence the expected
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conditional positive relationship with breaking mental set than running span whole recall
and immediate free recall markers of PM.
Method
Participants
One hundred ninety-one undergraduate students (134 females, 57 males; Mage =
20 years, SD = 4.5) participated for psychology course credit. An a priori power analysis
(G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) indicated that a minimum of 68
participants was required. Thus, the sample was more than sufficient to detect a mediumsized effect [Cohen’s (1992) f2 = .15, 1 – β > .80, α = .05] for the moderation analyses
described below. Exclusion criteria were the same as in Study 1. Seventeen additional
participants were removed for (a) committing more than 20 errors on the math portion of
the operation span (n = 5; Conway et al., 2005), (b) prior exposure to the water jug
problems (n = 2), or (c) identification as a univariate outlier (i.e., scores greater than 3
SDs from scale means; n = 10). Eighty of the total 191 participants (42%) solved all three
set problems and were thereby deemed to have established mental set.
Procedure and Tasks
Participants in Study 2 performed the same three WMC tasks (antisaccade,
running span, and operation span), and the same problem-solving task (water jug), as in
Study 1. The dependent measure(s) for each task was also the same as in Study 1, except
that running span scores were split by trial type. Participants in Study 2 additionally
performed an immediate free recall task. The order of the WMC tasks was
counterbalanced across participants.
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Running span task (Broadway & Engle, 2010). As described above and in Study
1, the running span task required participants to remember the last 3–7 letters from lists
that were 3–9 letters long. The dependent variables were the total number of to-beremembered letters correctly recalled in the correct serial position (regardless of whether
the entire sequence of letters was correct) on whole recall trials (5 trials, 25 letters) and
partial recall trials (10 trials, 50 letters).
Immediate free recall task (Unsworth et al., 2010). Participants were shown a
list of 8 words and asked to recall the words in any order. All words were common nouns
containing 3−5 letters and one syllable. Each word was presented for 750 ms, followed
by a 250 ms delay. Immediately following each list (2 practice, 7 critical), participants
were given 1 minute to type as many of the words as possible. Estimates of PM were
derived using the Tulving and Colotla (1970) scoring method (see Shipstead et al., 2014).
If seven or fewer words fell between presentation and recall of a given word, it was
deemed recalled from PM. The dependent variable was the total number of words
correctly recalled from PM (regardless of order) across all critical lists, out of 56
possible.
Results and Discussion
Variables and Analyses
Operational definitions of individual differences in AC, PM, and SM were the
same as in Study 1, except that multiple measures of PM were examined (i.e., running
span whole recall, running span partial recall, and immediate free recall). Again,
performance on the critical water jug problems was examined only for individuals who
established mental set (i.e., correctly solved all three set problems; n = 80).
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Moderation analyses were conducted using multiple linear regression (Irwin &
McClelland, 2001). Each moderated multiple regression model contained three meancentered continuous predictors (reflecting individual differences in AC, PM, and SM),
and product terms for the two interactions of interest (i.e., AC × PM, AC × SM;
calculated using the centered variables). Each of the three PM measures (i.e., running
span whole recall, running span partial recall, and immediate free recall) was tested
separately using the same basic model in which AC and SM were indexed by antisaccade
and operation span, respectively. The same three models were applied to each of the two
dependent variables (i.e., number of set problems solved, number of critical problems
solved using simple strategies). To control for shared variance, predictors and both
interaction terms were entered simultaneously. A separate hierarchical regression was
used to assess the joint contribution of the two interaction terms (entered in step 2) to
model fit as indexed by ∆R2. Significant interactions were probed using simple slope
analyses (see Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Model
assumptions were tested using the same method as described in Study 1 and no evidence
for violations were found. VIFs did not exceed 1.35 for any of the predictors across
models.
Set Problems
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among key variables for all participants
are presented in Table 7. The number of set problems solved was significantly positively
associated with all of the WMC measures except immediate free recall. Additionally, it
was found that the number of set problems solved was significantly negatively associated
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with the number of critical problems solved using simple strategies (M = 1.30, SD = 1.23,
r(189) = −.20, p = .006), consistent with Study 1.
Table 7
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among key variables for all participants in
Study 2.
Correlations (r)
Measure

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

1. Antisaccade

00.76

00.14

—

2. RunSpan whole recall

17.49

04.62

.19**

—

3. RunSpan partial recall

22.55

06.95

.34**

.57**

—

4. Operation span

53.95

14.10

.35**

.29**

.32**

—

5. Immediate free recall

26.23

05.13

.05

.18**

.25**

.04

—

6. Set problems solved

01.85

01.16

.24**

.15*

.19**

.15*

.03

N = 191. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Moderation Analyses. Next, it was examined whether AC moderated the
relationships between PM and SM, and success on set problems. The number of set
problems solved was regressed on antisaccade (AC), operation span (SM), and either
running span whole recall (PM, Model 1), running span partial recall (PM, Model 2), or
immediate free recall (PM, Model 3), together with product terms for the two interactions
of interest (i.e., AC × PM, AC × SM).
These three models yielded similar results (see Table 8). Each model significantly
accounted for 7–8% of the variance in success on set problems [Model 1: R2 = .08, F(5,
185) = 3.16, p = .009; Model 2: R2 = .08, F(5, 185) = 3.21, p = .008; Model 3: R2 = .07,
F(5, 185) = 2.82, p = .018]. As predicted, each model resulted in a significant simple
effect of antisaccade [Model 1: β = .21, p = .006; Model 2: β = .19, p = .019; Model 3: β

35

= .21, p = .006]. These findings indicate that higher AC was associated with greater
success on set problems, regardless of which measure was used to index PM. No simple
effects of PM or SM were found, and no AC × PM or AC × SM interaction was obtained
(all Fs < 1.8, all ps > .17). Removing these non-significant interactions from the models
did not change the results. These findings indicate that the magnitude or direction of the
relationship between AC and success on the set problems did not depend on individual
differences in either PM or SM. Thus, consistent with Study 1, AC was important for
establishing mental set.
Table 8
Moderation analyses predicting the number of set problems solved for all participants in
Study 2.
Model
1

2

3

β

t

Sig.

sr2

Antisaccade (AC)

.21

2.77

.006

.04

Running span whole recall (PM)

.10

1.34

.183

.01

Operation span (SM)

.02

0.20

.841

.00

AC × PM

–.01

–0.08

.940

.00

AC × SM

–.09

–1.13

.261

.01

Antisaccade (AC)

.19

2.37

.019

.03

Running span partial recall (PM)

.11

1.35

.178

.01

Operation span (SM)

.02

0.29

.772

.00

AC × PM

–.03

–0.41

.683

.00

AC × SM

–.07

–0.87

.383

.00

Antisaccade (AC)

.21

2.79

.006

.04

Immediate free recall (PM)

.01

0.14

.888

.00

Operation span (SM)

.05

0.58

.566

.00

AC × PM

–.04

–0.55

.582

.00

AC × SM

–.08

–1.03

.307

.01

Predictor
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Note. AC = attention control; PM = primary memory; SM = secondary memory. All
variables reflect mean-centered scores treated as continuous variables.
N = 191.
Critical Problems
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among key variables for individuals
who established mental set (i.e., correctly solved all three set problems) are presented in
Table 9. The number of critical problems solved using simple strategies was not
significantly associated with any of the independent variables. Additionally, it was found
that errors on critical problems were low (i.e., < 10% of all answers provided failed to
produce the goal quantity), indicating that when these individuals were not using the
simple strategies, they were using the complex strategy the majority of the time.
Consistent with Study 1, the simpler (i.e., one-step) strategies were more efficient than
the complex (i.e., multistep) strategy: The more critical problems solved using the
simpler strategies, the faster were mean response times for critical problems correctly
solved (i.e., regardless of which strategy was used) (M = 16.08 sec, SD = 9.17 sec, r(59)
= −.41, p = .001).2

2

To ensure that the RT measure was based on an equal number of observations for each

participant, 18 participants who committed a combined total of 22 errors on the critical
problems, and 1 additional participant whose RT exceeded that of every other by a factor
of 3, were excluded from this analysis (see Beilock & DeCaro, 2007).
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Table 9
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among key variables for individuals who
established mental set in Study 2.
Correlations (r)
Measure

Mean

SD

1

1. Antisaccade

00.80

00.12

—

2. RunSpan whole recall

18.30

04.32

.21

—

3. RunSpan partial recall

23.74

06.83

.31**

.56**

—

4. Operation span

55.95

12.67

.36**

.17

.27*

—

5. Immediate free recall

26.26

04.97 –.02

.28**

.28**

.06

6. Critical problems
solved using simple
strategies

00.94

01.15

.10

.20

2

3

−.14

4

−.19

5

—
.08

n = 80. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Moderation Analyses. The principal research question for Study 2 was whether
AC moderates the relationships between breaking mental set and both PM and SM.
Again, each measure of PM was tested separately using the same basic model in which
AC and SM were indexed by antisaccade and operation span, respectively. The results
are described below and summarized in Table 10, followed by simple slope analyses.
In the first model tested, running span whole recall was used to index PM (see
Table 10, Model 1). Specifically, the number of critical problems solved using simple
strategies was regressed on antisaccade (AC), running span whole recall (PM), operation
span (SM), and the two hypothesized interactions (AC × PM, AC × SM). This model
significantly accounted for 24% of the variance in simple strategy use, F(5, 74) = 4.72, p
= .001. There were significant simple effects of antisaccade (β = .31, p = .007) and
operation span (β = –.39, p = .001). No simple effect of running span whole recall was
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found (β = .12, p = .275). However, as predicted, significant AC × PM (β = .28, p = .012)
and AC × SM (β = –.30, p = .010) interactions were obtained. A separate hierarchical
regression analysis of these same variables confirmed that the joint contribution of the
two interaction terms (entered in step 2) was signficant, ∆R2 = .11, p = .007.
The second model tested was the same as the first, except that running span
partial recall was used to index PM (see Table 10, Model 2). This model significantly
accounted for 22% of the variance in simple strategy use, F(5, 74) = 4.12, p = .002.
Consistent with Model 1, there were significant simple effects of antisaccade (β = .36, p
= .002) and operation span (β = –.36, p = .003), but not running span partial recall (β = –
.17, p = .138). There was also a significant AC × SM interaction (β = –.27, p = .023).
However, unlike Model 1, no AC × PM interaction was obtained (β = .15, p = .172).
Removing the non-significant interaction did not change these results. Hierarchical
regression indicated that the joint contribution of the two interaction terms (entered in
step 2) was not signficant, ∆R2 = .06, p = .052.
The third model tested was the same as the previous two models, except
immediate free recall was used to index PM (see Table 10, Model 3). This model
significantly accounted for 24% of the variance in simple strategy use, F(5, 74) = 4.70, p
= .001. Consistent with Models 1 and 2, there were significant simple effects of
antisaccade (β = .26, p = .021) and operation span (β = –.37, p = .002), but not immediate
free recall (β = –.01, p = .904). Consistent with Model 1, significant AC × PM (β = .28, p
= .016) and AC × SM (β = –.29, p = .013) interactions were obtained. Hierarchical
regression confirmed that the joint contribution of the two interaction effects (entered in
step 2) was signficant, ∆R2 = .10, p = .009.
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In sum, moderation analyses revealed that (a) AC moderated the relationship
between PM and simple strategy use when PM was indexed by running span whole recall
(Model 1) and immediate free recall (Model 3), but not running span partial recall (Model
2), and (b) AC moderated the relationship between SM and simple strategy use regardless
of which variable was used to index PM. These findings suggest that running span whole
recall and immediate free recall provided more reliable estimates of PM than running
span partial recall in the hypothesized model. Thus, Model 2 will not be analyzed further.
Table 10
Moderation analyses predicting the number of critical problems solved using simple
strategies for individuals who established mental set in Study 2.
Model
1

β

t

Sig.

sr2

Antisaccade (AC)

.31

2.77

.007

.08

Running span whole recall (PM)

.12

1.10

.275

.01

–.39

–3.40

.001

.12

AC × PM

.28

2.59

.012

.07

AC × SM

–.30

–2.65

.010

.07

.36

3.16

.002

.11

Running span partial recall (PM)

–.17

–1.50

.138

.02

Operation span (SM)

–.36

–3.04

.003

.10

AC × PM

.15

1.38

.172

.02

AC × SM

–.27

–2.32

.023

.06

.26

2.36

.021

.06

Immediate free recall (PM)

–.01

–0.12

.904

.00

Operation span (SM)

–.37

–3.21

.002

.11

AC × PM

.28

2.48

.016

.06

AC × SM

–.29

–2.56

.013

.07

Predictor

Operation span (SM)

2

3

Antisaccade (AC)

Antisaccade (AC)

Note. AC = attention control; PM = primary memory; SM = secondary memory. All
variables reflect mean-centered scores treated as continuous variables.
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n = 80.
Simple Slope Analyses. The significant interactions found in Models 1 and 3
were further examined using simple slope analyses (see Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen et
al., 2003). For each interaction, the relationship between the focal predictor (i.e., PM or
SM) and the number of critical problems solved using simple strategies was plotted and
tested at higher and lower levels of the moderator (i.e., AC, centered one standard
deviation above and below the mean, respectively). Plots include point estimates with
95% confidence intervals for higher and lower levels of the focal predictor (also centered
one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively). Tests determined
whether each conditional relationship depicted differed statistically from zero. To
facilitate comparisons between Models 1 and 3, the results are grouped by the focal
predictor.
First, the interaction between AC and PM was examined. Specifically, the
relationship between simple strategy use and PM—as indexed by either running span
whole recall (Model 1) or immediate free recall (Model 3)—was tested when AC was one
standard deviation above and below the mean. As shown in Figure 5, these tests revealed
strikingly similar results. For individuals higher in AC, PM was significantly positively
associated with simple strategy use in Model 1 (β = .41, t(74) = 2.45, p = .016, sr2 = .06)
and Model 3 (β = .24, t(74) = 2.10, p = .039, sr2 = .04). For lower AC individuals, the
relationship between PM and simple strategy use was not statistically different from zero
in either model [Model 1: β = −.17, t(74) = −1.23, p = .221; Model 3: β = −.27, t(74) =
−1.50, p = .136].
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These results indicate that higher PM leads to a greater likelihood of breaking
mental set, but only for individuals higher in AC. These findings are consistent with the
positive association found between PM (as indexed by running span total scores) and
breaking mental set in Study 1 and reveal a possible boundary condition for this
relationship. Specifically, the current findings suggest that PM relies on AC to support
breaking mental set.

Figure 5. Number of critical problems solved using simple strategies as a function of
individual differences in attention control and primary memory as indexed by running
span whole recall (Model 1; left) and immediate free recall (Model 3; right) in Study 2.
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Next, the interaction between AC and SM was examined using the method
described above. Again, results were similar across models. As shown in Figure 6, SM
was significantly negatively associated with simple strategy use for individuals higher in
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AC in Model 1 (β = −.69, t(74) = −3.73, p < .001, sr 2 = .14) and Model 2 (β = −.65, t(74)
= −3.57, p < .001, sr 2 = .13). For lower AC individuals, the relationship between SM and
simple strategy use was not statistically different from zero in either model [Model 1: β =
−.09, t(74) = −0.74, p = .460; Model 3: β = −.28, t(74) = −1.51, p = .136].
These results indicate that higher SM leads to a lower likelihood of breaking
mental set when combined with higher AC. These findings are consistent with the
negative association observed between SM and breaking mental set in Study 1 but, again,
reveal a possible boundary condition for this relationship. Specifically, the current
findings suggest that SM relies on AC to constrain breaking mental set.

Figure 6. Number of critical problems solved using simple strategies as a function of
individual differences in attention control and secondary memory for Model 1 (PM
indexed by running span whole recall; left) and Model 3 (PM indexed by immediate free
recall; right) in Study 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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In sum, simple slope analyses revealed that (a) individuals higher in both AC and
PM demonstrated greater flexibility on critical problems, whereas (b) individuals higher
in AC but lower in SM demonstrated greater flexibility on critical problems.
Furthermore, these results were the same regardless of whether PM was indexed by
running span whole recall or immediate free recall. Thus, running span whole recall and
immediate free recall provided comparable estimates of PM in the hypothesized model.
Conclusions
Study 2 offered additional support for the theory of functional opponency in
WMC, proposed in Study 1. Furthermore, Study 2 provided initial support for the novel
hypothesis that AC moderates the relationships between breaking mental set and both PM
and SM. By using a larger sample in Study 2, a greater number of individuals established
mental set and thus were included in the analysis of breaking mental set. This allowed for
a more thorough examination of the relationship between AC and breaking mental set
than was possible in Study 1. Additionally, Study 2 demonstrated that some measures of
PM had greater predictive utility in the hypothesized model than others. As predicted,
PM measures without distractors (i.e., running span whole recall and immediate free
recall) evidenced the expected conditional positive relationship with breaking mental set,
whereas a PM measure with distractors (i.e., running span partial recall) did not.
One possibility is that the observed patterns of results are specific to the water jug
task. Specifically, the version of the water jug task used in Studies 1 and 2 required
participants to discover the complex strategy to solve the first three problems without
assistance. Breaking mental set could only be examined for those individuals who solved
all three set problems and were thus deemed to have initially established mental set.
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Thus, analysis of the key variable of interest (i.e., breaking mental set) was restricted to
those individuals who demonstrated a related but distinct ability (i.e., the ability to
discover the complex strategy). Less than 50% of participants in Studies 1 and 2 correctly
solved the first three problems, drastically limiting the critical sample. There is no prior
research indicating that the ability to break mental set is contingent upon the ability to
independently establish it (Wiley, 1998). Study 3 addresses this limitation by using a
modified version of the water jug task, designed to retain a higher proportion of
participants in the critical sample.
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY 3
Study 3 further examined the hypothesis that AC moderates the relationships
between the ability to break mental set and both PM and SM. In Study 2, this hypothesis
was tested using the same version of the water jug task used in Study 1, but with a larger
sample. In the current study, this hypothesis was tested using a modified version of the
water jug task, designed to control for individual differences in the ability to discover the
complex strategy by providing all participants the answer to the first three problems.
Specifically, all participants were instructed on the complex strategy, and required to
demonstrate basic comprehension by completing a worked example set problem before
proceeding to the experimental problems (see Figure 7). The goal of this modification
was to equalize knowledge of the complex strategy in order to obtain a larger and more
representative sample for analyzing the primary variable of interest (breaking mental set
on the critical problems).
It was hypothesized that the conditional relationships between breaking mental set
and both PM and SM would be found regardless of whether individuals discovered the
complex strategy independently (Study 2) or by learning the complex strategy by
example (Study 3).
Study 3 also tested the novel hypothesis AC moderates the relationship between
SM and establishing mental set on the modified water jug task. Attention control may

46

support the ability to form an initial problem representation (DeCaro, 2018; DeCaro et
al., 2016; Wiley et al., 2011). On the standard water jug task (Studies 1 and 2),
discovering the complex strategy needed to solve the set problems (and thus establish
mental set) may rely on the ability to form an initial mental representation of the water
jug problems. On the modified water jug task, providing a worked example of the
complex strategy was expected to decrease reliance on the ability to form an initial
problem representation (and thus AC) for establishing mental set. Consequently, the
modified water jug task was expected to increase reliance on SM for correctly executing
the complex strategy as it was demonstrated in the worked example. Finally, if AC
supports (suboptimal) retrieval of the complex strategy via SM on the critical problems
(Study 2), it may also support (optimal) retrieval of this same strategy on the set problems
in the modified water jug task (Duncan, Schramm, Thompson, & Dumontheil, 2012;
Sakai, 2008). Therefore, it was predicted that SM would be positively associated with
success on the set problems at higher levels of AC. Finding that AC and SM interact to
predict both stability on the set problems and flexibility on the critical problems in
opposite directions would provide convergent support for the proposed the theory of
functional opponency in WMC.
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Jug A

Jug B

Jug C

Goal

14

48

4

26

This problem can be solved in 4 steps:
First: Fill Jug B with water. Jug B now has 48.
Second: Pour Jug B into Jug A until Jug A is full. Jug B now has 34
(i.e., Jug B – Jug A or 48 – 14).
Third: Pour Jug B into Jug C until Jug C is full. Jug B now has 30
(i.e., Jug B – Jug C or 34 – 4).
Fourth: Empty Jug C and pour Jug B into Jug C again. Jug B now has 26,
the goal quantity (i.e., Jug B – Jug C or 30 – 4).
You would type B – A – 2C, because you filled B, poured it into A,
then poured it into C twice (48 – 14 – 2 * 4 or 48 – 14 – 4 – 4).

Figure 7. Worked example set problem used in Study 3.
Method
Participants
One hundred eighty-two undergraduate students (108 females, 74 males; Mage =
20 years, SD = 3.5) participated for psychology course credit. Sample size was based on
the same a priori power analysis used in Study 2. Exclusion criteria were the same as in
Studies 1 and 2. Nineteen additional participants were removed for (a) committing more
than 20 errors on the math portion of the operation span (n = 7; Conway et al., 2005), (b)
prior exposure to the water jug problems (n = 1), or (c) identification as a univariate
outlier (i.e., scores greater than 3 SDs from scale means; n = 11).
Procedure and Tasks
Study 3 consisted of the same procedure and tasks as Study 1, with the following
exceptions: (a) like Study 2, the WMC tasks were counterbalanced, (b) running span
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performance was examined only for whole recall trials, and (c) participants performed a
modified version of the water jug task.
Modified water jug task. Problems and procedure were the same as in Studies 1
and 2, except that after the first practice problem, participants were given a second
practice problem that required use of the complex strategy for its solution (Figure 7).
Participants were given two attempts to solve the second practice problem with feedback
(“correct” or “incorrect”) before seeing a worked example that explained the solution.
Two incorrect responses prompted the worked example screen, followed by a final
opportunity to enter the correct response before proceeding to the experimental problems
(set then critical problems). To control for possible differences in participants’ mental
representation of the problems resulting from seeing the worked example, individuals
who correctly solved the example problem on their first or second attempt were also
shown the worked example before proceeding to the experimental problems. Again,
individuals were deemed to have established mental set if they correctly solved the three
subsequent set problems.
Results and Discussion
Variables and Analyses
Operational definitions of individual differences in AC, PM, and SM were the
same as in Study 1, except that running span whole recall was used to index PM (see
Study 2). Dependent variables, derived from the modified water jug task, were the same
as in Studies 1 and 2. Again, performance on the critical problems was examined only for
individuals who established mental set (i.e., correctly solved all three set problems; n =
124).
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Moderation analyses were conducted using the same approach as in Study 2,
except that only one model was tested for each dependent variable. Residuals and
scatterplots indicated the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity were met, and
VIF values (< 1.5) indicated that multicollinearity was not an issue in either model.
Set Problems
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for all participants are presented in
Table 11. The number of set problems solved was significantly positively associated with
operation span, but not significantly associated with antisaccade or running span whole
recall. Additionally, the number of set problems solved was significantly negatively
associated with the number of critical problems solved using the simple strategies (M =
0.82, SD = 1.12, r(180) = −.22, p = .003), consistent with Studies 1 and 2.
Table 11
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among key variables for all
participants in Study 3.
Correlations (r)
Measure

Mean

SD

1

2

3

1. Antisaccade

00.79

00.13

—

2. RunSpan whole recall

17.63

04.42

.26**

—

3. Operation span

58.63

11.57

.18*

.27**

—

4. Set problems solved

02.50

00.86

.08

.58

.17*

N = 182. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Moderation Analysis. Next, it was examined whether AC moderated the
relationships between PM and SM, and success on set problems for the modified water
jug task. The number of set problems solved was regressed on antisaccade (AC), running
span whole recall (PM), and operation span (SM), together with product terms for the two
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interactions (i.e., AC × PM, AC × SM). This model significantly accounted for 7% of the
variance in simple strategy use, F(5, 176) = 2.66, p = .024 (see Table 12). There was a
significant simple effect of operation span (β = .19, p = .016). There was also a positive
but not significant simple effect of antisaccade (β = .15, p = .052). No simple effect of
running span whole recall was found (β = –.07, p = .416), and no antisaccade × running
span whole recall interaction was obtained (β = –.02, p = .842). As predicted, a
significant antisaccade × operation span interaction was found (β = .18, p = .022).
Removing the non-significant interaction from the model did not change these results.
Table 12.
Moderation analysis predicting the number of set problems solved for all participants in
Study 3.
β

t

Sig.

sr2

.15

1.96

.052

.02

–.07

–0.81

.416

.00

.19

2.44

.016

.03

AC × PM

–.02

–0.20

.842

.00

AC × SM

.18

2.31

.022

.03

Predictor
Antisaccade (AC)
Running span whole recall (PM)
Operation span (SM)

Note. AC = attention control; PM = primary memory; SM = secondary memory.
N = 182.
Simple Slope Analysis. The significant AC × SM interaction was further
examined by testing simple slopes. As shown in Figure 8, for individuals higher in AC,
SM was significantly positively associated with the number of set problems solved (β =
.36, t(176) = 3.10, p = .002, sr2 = .05). For lower AC individuals, the relationship
between SM and the number of set problems solved was not statistically different from
zero (β = .02, t(176) = 0.23, p = .815). These results indicate that individuals higher in
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SM were more likely to establish mental set if they were also higher in AC. Specifically,
greater ability to efficiently retrieve previously used strategies via SM (Harrison et al.,
2015), when coupled with a stable focus of attention, may facilitate performance on
familiar problems.

Figure 8. Number of set problems solved as a function of individual differences in
secondary memory and attention control (AC) in Study 3. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
Critical Problems
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for individuals who established mental
set (i.e., correctly solved all three set problems) are presented in Table 13. The
modification made to the water jug task had the intended result of increasing the
proportion of individuals included in the critical sample. Of the 182 total participants,
124 (69%) solved all three set problems and were thereby deemed to have established
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mental set. The modification made to the water jug task thus had the intended effect of
increasing the proportion of participants who solved all three set problems (by over 20%).
The number of critical problems solved using simple strategies was significantly
positively associated with antisaccade, but not significantly associated with running span
whole recall or operation span. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, errors on critical
problems were low (i.e., < 7% of all answers provided failed to produce the goal
quantity), indicating that when these individuals were not using the simple strategies,
they were using the complex strategy the majority of the time. Furthermore, the simpler
(i.e., one-step) strategies were again found to be more efficient than the complex (i.e.,
multistep) strategy: The more critical problems solved using the simpler strategies, the
faster were mean response times for critical problems correctly solved (regardless of
which strategy was used) (M = 18.30 sec, SD = 12.50 sec, r(98) = −.20, p = .044).3

3

To ensure that the RT measure was based on an equal number of observations for each

participant, 23 participants who committed a combined total of 25 errors on the critical
problems, and 1 additional participant whose RT exceeded that of every other by a factor
of 3, were excluded from this analysis (see Beilock & DeCaro, 2007).
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Table 13
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among key variables for individuals
who established mental set in Study 3.
Correlations (r)
Measure

Mean

SD

1

2

3

1. Antisaccade

00.80

00.13

—

2. RunSpan whole recall

17.69

04.43

.27**

—

3. Operation span

59.75

10.80

.32**

.30**

—

4. Critical problems solved
using simple strategies

00.60

01.02

.22*

.14

–.13

n = 124. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Moderation Analyses. The principal research question for Study 3 was whether
AC moderates the effects of PM and SM for critical problem flexibility on the modified
water jug task. To test this question, the number of critical problems solved using simple
strategies was regressed on antisaccade (AC), running span whole recall (PM), operation
span (SM), and the two hypothesized interactions (i.e., AC × PM, AC × SM). This model
significantly accounted for 17% of the variance in simple strategy use, F(5, 118) = 4.96,
p < .001 (see Table 14).
There were significant simple effects of antisaccade (β = .24, p = .013), operation
span (β = –.40, p < .001), and running span whole recall (β = .27, p = .008). Of note, no
simple effect of running span whole recall was observed in Study 2, suggesting that the
more comprehensive sample used in Study 3 contributed to this result. Significant
antisaccade × running span whole recall (β = .21, p = .028) and antisaccade × operation
span (β = –.25, p = .013) interactions were obtained. Hierarchical regression confirmed
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that the joint contribution of the two interaction effects (terms entered in step 2) was
signficant, ∆R2 = .06, p = .017.
Table 14.
Moderation analysis predicting the number of critical problems solved using simple
strategies for individuals who established mental set in Study 3.
β

t

Sig.

sr2

Antisaccade (AC)

.24

2.54

.013

.04

Running span whole recall (PM)

.27

2.71

.008

.05

–.40

–3.92

.000

.11

AC × PM

.21

2.23

.028

.03

AC × SM

–.25

–2.51

.013

.04

Predictor

Operation span (SM)

Note. AC = attention control; PM = primary memory; SM = secondary memory.
n = 124.
Simple Slope Analyses. The relationships between the number of critical
problems solved using the simple strategies and both PM and SM was examined at higher
and lower levels of AC (± 1 standard deviation). The plots for both interaction effects are
shown in Figure 9.
As predicted, results were the same as in Study 2. For individuals higher in AC,
PM was significantly positively associated with simple strategy use (β = .44, t(118) =
3.07, p = .003, sr2 = .07). For lower AC individuals, the relationship between PM and
simple strategy use was not statistically different from zero in either model (β = .09,
t(118) = 0.86, p = .389). These findings indicate that individuals higher in PM were more
likely to break mental set if they were also higher in AC.
Conversely, SM was significantly negatively associated with simple strategy use
for individuals higher in AC (β = −.62, t(118) = −3.87, p < .001, sr 2 = .10). For lower AC
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individuals, the relationship between SM and simple strategy use was not statistically
different from zero (β = −.19, t(74) = −1.82, p = .071). These findings indicate that
individuals lower in SM were more likely to break mental set if they were also higher in
AC.

Figure 9. Number of critical problems solved using simple strategies as a function of
individual differences in primary memory and attention control (left), and secondary
memory and attention control (right) for individuals who established mental set in Study
3. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Taken together, these findings suggest that AC both supports and constrains
functionally opponent processes associated with different WMC mechanisms.
Specifically, in Study 3 neither the positive relationship between breaking mental set and
PM, nor the negative relationship between breaking mental set and SM, was entirely
dependent on higher levels of AC, as indicated by the significant simple effects.
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Conclusions
Study 3 supported the hypothesis that AC moderates the relationships between
PM and SM and breaking mental set on the modified water jug task, replicating Study 2.
Taken together, these findings indicate that the predicted pattern of results did not depend
on whether individuals discovered the complex strategy freely (Study 2) or by example
(Study 3). These findings also suggest that the hypothesized model may generalize to
other mental set phenomena outside the laboratory (see Ricks et al., 2007).
By demonstrating the predicted relationships between PM and SM and breaking
mental set at varying levels of AC, Study 3 also supported a more generalized application
of the theory of functional opponency in WMC. Furthermore, Study 3 provided initial
support for the novel hypothesis that AC moderates the relationship between SM and
establishing mental set. Specifically, Study 3 demonstrated that higher AC not only
exacerbates the negative relationship between SM and breaking mental set, but also
amplifies the positive relationship between SM and establishing mental set. By
demonstrating convergent, functionally opponent effects across problem types, Study 3
strengthens the validity of the underlying theory of functional opponency in WMC
(Schmidt, 2009).
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CHAPTER V
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Although cognitive flexibility is sometimes considered a hallmark of high WMC,
high WMs also persist in using suboptimal strategies (e.g., Beilock & DeCaro, 2007;
Fischer & Holt, 2017; Richmond et al., 2015). To address this apparent inconsistency in
the literature, the present research adopted a multifaceted view of WMC (Shipstead et al.,
2014; see also Unsworth et al., 2014) to advance a novel theory of functional opponency
in which different WMC mechanisms interact in ways that both support and constrain
cognitive flexibility.
Across three studies, individual differences in three WMC mechanisms (AC, PM,
and SM) differentially predicted performance on Luchins’s (1942) water jug task. Study
1 offered initial support for the theory of functional opponency by demonstrating that
different WMC mechanisms (PM and SM) predict the same cognitive flexibility outcome
(“breaking” mental set on the critical water jug problems) in opposite directions. Study 2
added further support to the proposed theory by replicating the pattern of results from
Study 1, while also demonstrating the role AC plays in moderating these effects. Study 3
strongly supported the proposed theory by demonstrating that the same pattern of results
observed in Study 2 can be obtained using a less restrictive methodology (i.e., by directly
providing participants the complex strategy needed to solve the set problems and
establish mental set).
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A negative relationship between WMC and breaking mental set on the water jug
task was found in a previous study in which WMC (as measured by complex span tasks)
was treated as a unitary construct (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007), consistent with the
influential “executive attention” view of WMC (Engle, 2002; cf. Engle, 2018). One goal
of the present research was to determine whether this negative association could be
explained by one or more WMC mechanisms. Results from each study indicated that
higher SM was associated with lower likelihood of breaking mental set, supporting the
hypothesis that greater ability to efficiently retrieve previously used strategies hinders
breaking mental set (Harrison et al., 2015; Verguts & De Boeck, 2002). These results
suggest that the finding from Beilock and DeCaro (2007) may have been driven by SM.
A common contention in creativity research is that negative associations between
WMC and problem-solving are driven by AC (see Wiley & Jarosz, 2012, for a review).
Specifically, AC helps constrain focal attention to relevant information and restrain
inappropriate thoughts and responses (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2003; McVay & Kane, 2012).
In problem situations where the solution path suggested by prior knowledge or
experience is inappropriate, high WMs may overlook remote alternatives by virtue of
having higher AC (Ansburg & Hill, 2003; Rerko & Oberauer, 2013; Vartanian, 2009;
Wegbreit, Suzuki, Grabowecky, Kounios, & Beeman, 2012; Zabelina & Robinson,
2010). In contrast, the present research indicates that SM plays an important role in
limiting the discovery of new solutions by facilitating the retrieval of those that have
worked in the past. The multifaceted view of WMC and the proposed theory of function
opponency may offer new insights into the nature these phenomena.
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Positive associations with WMC are extremely common in the literature (e.g.,
Beier & Oswald, 2012). However, the positive association found between PM and
breaking mental set in the present research is noteworthy for two major reasons. First,
these findings provide novel evidence that greater ability to disengage from no-longerrelevant information via PM enables individuals to break mental set (Shipstead et al.,
2014). Second, Study 2 demonstrated that disengagement is not uniquely tapped by the
running span task. Rather, when running span trial types were examined separately,
whole recall trials, and not partial recall trials, were positively associated with breaking
mental set. Furthermore, the same pattern of results was found using immediate free
recall, a more common measure of PM (Unsworth et al., 2010). These findings suggest
that greater absolute capacity (i.e., the maximum amount of information that can be
maintained in the focus of attention; Cowan et al., 2005), apart from the influence of
factors that contribute to effective WM maintenance (i.e., in the presence of distractors;
Poole & Kane, 2009), facilitates breaking mental set (Oberauer et al., 2007; cf. Shipstead
et al., 2016). Future studies may benefit from examining running span performance as a
function of trial type, as whole recall and partial recall scores may demonstrate different
patterns of association with other outcomes.
An important question raised by the present research concerns the role of AC in
the hypothesized model. In Studies 1 and 2, AC was found to be positively associated
with success on the set problems, and thus important for establishing mental set.
However, AC was also found to moderate the relationships between PM and SM and
breaking mental set. Specifically, in Studies 2 and 3, higher AC supported both the
positive relationship between PM and breaking mental set and the negative relationship
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between SM and breaking mental set. Additionally, in Study 3, when the complex
strategy needed to solve the set problems was provided to participants, AC was no longer
associated with establishing mental set. Rather, higher AC was found to support a
positive relationship between SM and establishing mental set—the inverse of the
relationship higher AC supported between SM and breaking mental set.
Taken together, these findings suggest that AC plays an important role in
balancing trade-offs between flexibility and stability that are driven by individual
differences in PM and SM. A possible explanation for the unique role of AC in the
hypothesized model is that all tasks likely require some degree of goal maintenance and
thus benefit from higher AC (Engle, 2018). If cognitive stability and flexibility subserve
functionally opposing “computational goals” (Badre & Wagner, 2006; see also Hazy,
Frank, & O'Reilly, 2007), and AC is an essential component of effective goal pursuit,
then AC may support processes that further either of these goals. Specifically, the current
findings supported the hypothesis that AC would support PM by limiting attentional
capture during disengagement, when intrusions from SM are more likely, furthering the
goal of flexibility (e.g., Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011; Mayr et al., 2014). These same
findings also supported the hypothesis that AC would also support SM by facilitating the
identification of seemingly relevant retrieval cues, furthering the goal of stability (e.g.,
Hills et al., 2010; Lilienthal et al., 2015; Schilling et al., 2014). Future studies may
benefit from testing AC as a possible moderator for both new and established WMC
effects (e.g., Sattizahn et al. 2016). However, further research is needed to develop a
better understanding of the interplay of WMC mechanisms. In particular, the present
research suggests that research examining intra-individual differences in WMC
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mechanisms may offer further insights in the diverse nature of cognitive abilities (see
Braver, Cole, & Yarkoni, 2010).
The multifaceted view of WMC provides new research opportunities for
reexamining classic effects and long-standing assumptions (e.g., Martin et al., 2017;
Sattizahn et al. 2016). Indeed, the present research extends the multifaceted view of
WMC by demonstrating that WMC mechanisms sometimes show opposing patterns of
correlations with other measures. These findings have important implications for
individual differences research. Specifically, the theory of functional opponency in WMC
cautions against simple low/high WM dichotomies, suggesting that characteristics of
“high WMs” can lead to conflicting patterns of results. Cognitive flexibility and cognitive
stability may not necessarily be opposite ends of a continuum; rather, multiple
components of cognitive control may facilitate or hinder flexibility. A better
understanding of how WMC mechanisms both independently and jointly support and
constrain cognitive performance may further development of effective training regimens
and intervention strategies to facilitate learning and problem solving across the lifespan
(e.g., Ionescu, 2019; Redick, 2019; Zaehringer, Falquez, Schubert, Nees, & Barnow,
2018).
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